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-{L. A. No. 20921. In Bank. Aug. 18, 1950.] 
EDNA HARRIET STOCK, Appellant,v. GLENN L. MEEK 
et aI., Respondents. 
[1] Appeal-Moot QuestioDS.-On appeal from a judgment for 
defendants in an action to rescind the purchase of space in 
aD apartment building, plaiDtUf's cause of action did no' 
become "moot" by her loss of the :pace, where she had made 
a bonafide offer of restoration when she gave notice of 
rescission and defendants after judgment twice acquired the 
space at public sales. ' 
[2] ld. - Bight of Review - Loss by Acceptance of Benefits of 
Judgment.-In an action for rescission, defendants were not 
entitled to have an appeal from a judgment in their favor dis-
missed on the ground that plaintiff, in accepting her homestead 
aemption in her apartment which was sold on execution under 
the judgment, had accepted benefits from the judgment. In 
order to benefit from the homestead exemption the proceeds of 
the sale must be accepted within six months (Civ. Code, § 1251), 
and hence the exemption usually must be accepted before an 
appeal from the judgment can be completed. 
[3] Oancellation-PleadiDg-Variance.-In an action for rescission 
and for money had and received, plainti1f's testi;mony should 
not have been excluded on the ground that it constituted a 
'fariance from the issues, where the offered proof tended to 
substantiate allegations in • valid complaint for rescission 
-because of mutual Jpistake of law, and where, e'fen if the 
offered proof constituted a variance, it could Dot be said that 
defendants were misled to their prejudice in maintaining their 
action or defense on the merits. 
['] Id.-Evidence.~In aD action to rescind the purchase of space 
in .an apartment building, plaintiff was entitled to introduce 
[1] See 2 Oal.Jur. 125; 3 Am.Jur. 308. 
licK. Dig. References: [1] Appeal and Error, § 18; [2] Appeal 
and Error, §110; [3] Cancellation, §13; [4] Cancellation, §15; 
[6] Cancellation, § 90; [0] Interest, § 41; [1,8] Iaterest,131. 
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'evidence extrinsic to her written agreement with defendants 
which stated that. she had a permanent right to Dclusive 
occupation to the space, where the evidence substantiated 
allegations in her complaint for rescission for mistake of 
law in that Are regulations prevented her from obtaining such 
occupancy. 
[6] Itl':"'Appeal-lLeversible Error.-In an action to rescind the 
purchase of a space in an apartment building, the court 
committed reversible error in excluding plaintiif's evidence 
that fire regulations prevented her from securing exclusive 
occupancy to the space as promised by defendants, since such 
exclusion prevented her from presenting her ease for recovery. 
[8] Interest--U8U17-Time "1'0 Sue.-The Usury Law (Deering's 
Gen. Laws, Act 3757) does not abrogate any common law 
rights of borrowers as parties to an illegal contract, and a 
borrower may bring an action for money had and received 
to reCover usurious intereSt paid within two years of the 
suit. (Code Civ. Proe., § 339(1).) 
[1] Itl-U8U17-Who m&7 Complain.,-Proiection of the usury 
laws is not waived by voluntary payment of excess interest by 
the borrower. 
[8] Itl-UsUI7-Who mal Compla.iD.-Payors of usurious interest 
were not til pari delicto with the recipient and were entitled to . i 
recover on their counterclaim in the recipient's action for 
rescission of a contract, where the payors were not fraudulent, 
the recipient knew of the usurious natm'e of the transaction, 
the payors did not attempt to recover until sued by the recipient 
on another matter, and no attempt was made to insert secretly 
a usUrious rate of interest to avoid payment of any interest or 
to take advantage of the treble damage provision of the law. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County and from an order denying a new trial. 
Thomas J. Cunningham, Judge. Judgment affirmed in part 
and reversed in part; ItPpeal from order dis~d. 
Action to rescind purchaSe of space in an apartment house. 
and to recover amount paid therefor, to which defendants 
filed a counterclaim. Part of judgment refusing plaintiff 
relief, reversed; part of judgment that defendants recover on 
eGunterelaim, affirmed. 
Desmond" Desmond and. Walter Desmond, Jr., for 
Appellant. 
Newton M. Todd, Fred A. Watkins and James J. Baker for 
Respondents. 
[7] See 14 Cal.Jur. 686; 65 Am.Jur. 324. 
'i 
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TRA YNOR, J .-Plaintiff brought this action to rescind the 
purchase from defendants, husband and wife, of space in a 
cooperatively-owned apartment house and to recover the 
amount she had paid defendants therefor. Defendants counter-
claimed for interest that they had paid plaintiff on a usurious 
loan. 
Early in 1945 defendants purchased the Palace Apartment 
Hotel in Long Beach. They intended to sell the 46 apartments 
to purchasers on an "oWD-YOur-own" plan. An escrow and 
trust were set up to convey title to purchasers, to pay ex-
penses, and to distribute any profits. 
Defendants consulted counsel about obtaining a permit 
from the Commissioner of Corporations to sell units to the 
public. Counsel advised that it was desirable to payoff a 
$20,000 second mortgage on the property before applying 
for the permit. Defendants raised $10,000 by selling 30 per 
cent of the venture to friends. One of these investors sug-
gested that plaintiff might furnish the remaining funds, and 
introduced defendant Glenn L. Meek to her. Defendant 
offered to give plaintiff a promissory note for $20,000, payable 
365 days from date, in return for a loan of $10,000. Plaintiff 
wished to consult an attorney and accompanied defendant 
to his attorney. Plaintiff testified that she intended to buy 
an interest in the venture, not to lend money to defendant, 
and that attorney had advised her that such a purchase would 
not be illegal but had disapproved of the investment as a 
gamble. Defendant and the intermediary who introduced 
the parties testified that the arrangement was always con-
sidered a loan and that the lawyer had specifically warned 
plaintiff that the transaction was therefore usurious. Plaintiff 
furnished the funds to defendants and was eventually paid 
$20,000 from the proceeds of the sales of apartments. 
In a separate transaction, plaintiff purchased a Donresi-
dential part of thE' same apartment house, called HSpace 101" 
by the parties. She paid defendant Glenn L. Meek $9,000 
for the •• exclusive and permanent right of occupancy," as 
described in the Certificate of Beneficial Ownership issued by 
the trustee, Security-First National Bank of Los Angeles. 
The record does not disclose what' use plaintiff intended to 
make of the space. Plaintiff alleged, however, that defendant 
had represented to her that the space could be "used and 
owned exclusively" after the lobby of the building had been 
completed, and that she had purchased the space in reliance 
) 
) 
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on this representation. Plaintiff alleged that when the work 
on the lobby was completed, she discovered that no one could 
obtain the exclusive and permanent occupancy of the space 
because of the building and fire regulations of the city of 
Long Beach. Plaintiff thereafter gave prompt notice of re-
scission; she seeks in this action to recover the $9,000 paid. 
Rer complaint also included Ii common count for $9,000 had 
and received by defendants for her use and benefit. 
Defendants denied the allegations of the complaint and 
counterclaimed for the interest or bonus paid on the note. 
At the trial without a jury, the court excluded testimony 
by plaintiff concerning oral misrepresentations by defendant. 
Her counsel made the following off('r of proof: "[that] a 
conversation took place in August. 1945 in which conversa-
tion the defendants Meek stated and represented to the 
plaintiff in this action, Mrs. Stock, that that part of Space 
101 described as B in Exhibit 1 could be closed off and locked 
and that that part, the doorway at A, in Plaintiff's Exhibit 
1, could be closed off and locked, and all space in 101 could 
be private and no one could enter. In October, 1945, we also 
are able to introduce a convcrsation between plaintiff and 
defendant Mepk. a similar statement, and assurance, and on 
November 7, 1945 a similar conversation took place and like-
wise in November, 1945 a similar conversation took place 
and thereafter various conversations took place between the 
plaintiff and the Meeks to the effect that the space I hne re-
ferred to could be cut off, the door placed thereon, and Space 
101 will be entirely a private property and no one else will 
be permitted to enter . . . that the plaintiff had confidence 
and trusted in the ~efendant. in making thos(' statements and 
otherwise she would not have purchased the property and 
after she purchased or determint'd. and was advised by the 
Fire Department, and it was pointed out to her that she could 
not do so, because of the. fire restrictions. .'. ." 
The trial court gave judgment for defendants in the rescis-
sion action on the basis of the evidence before it. The trial 
court also held that the earlier transaction between the parties 
was a usurious loan .• Tudgment for tht' bonus amount, $10,000, 
and interest was awarded defendants on their .counterclaim. 
Plaintiff appealed from the judgment and from an order 
denying the motion for new trial. The latter order is not 
appealable and the appeal therefrom is dismissed. (Gray v. 
Ootton. 174 Cal. 256 [162 P. 1019] ; Code Civ. Proc., § 963.) 
Defendants have moved to dismiss the appeal from the 
) 
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judgment in the light of the following events occurring after 
entry of judgment~ Plainti« gave notice of appeal on June 
23, 1948. Plaintiff did not, however, file a bond for stay of 
execution. Defendants levied execution on property of plain-
tiff, including her 'interest in the Palace Apartment Hotel 
trust representing Space 10] and Apartment 102. Before 
entry of judgment, plaintiff had filed and recorded a declara-
tion of homestead as a single person upon Apartment 702. 
On or about August 6, 1948, defendants applied to. the su-
perior court pursuant to Civil Code, section c 1245, for the 
appointment of appraisers to appraise plainti«'s homestead 
and requested that the court order the sale of Apartment 702. 
On September 28, 1948, the superior court ordered the sale 
after due notice to the judgment debtor, hearing, and ap-
praisal. On or about October 28, 1948, both Space 101 and 
Apartment 702 were .sold by the sheriff at public auction to 
the highest bidders. Space 10] was purchased by defendant 
Glenn Meek for $3,000, credited as a partial satisfaction of 
the judgment. Apartment 702 was purchast'd by one Watkins 
for $4,000, of which the sheriff paid plaintiff $3,000, hel' 
homestead exemption. On 01' about April 21, 1949, plaintiff 
transferred her power of redemption and propt'rty in Apart-
ment 702 to Abel L. McConnell and na M. McConnell. On 
April 22, 1949, the McConnells redeemed Apartment 702 
from the execution purchaser. 
After the sale of Space 101 to defendant Glenn Meek on 
execution, the maintenance charges required of plaintiff by 
the trust became delinquent. The trustee sold Space 101 at 
public auction on June 3, 1949, under a power of sale pro-
vided by the declaration of trust. Space 101 was &gain pur-
chased by defendants, who paid a cash consideration not 
exceeding $1,000. On lune 22, 1949, defendaIits made a bona 
fide sale of Space 101 for $4,050 to a third person or persoD8 
who are now the owners of the space. 
[1] Defendants move to dismiss the appeal on the ground 
that the questions involved have become moot. Their claim is 
not, however, that the outcome of the appeal is a matter of 
indifference to the parties or that consideration and disposi-
tion of the case on the merits cannot affect the substantial 
rights of the parties. They contend that plaintiff has destroyed 
her cause of action for rescission by her loss of Space 101, 
which she had offered to restore to defendants at tht' time 
abe gave notice of rescission. The eases relied on by defendant. 
) 
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(e.g., Lupton v. Domestic Utilities Mfg. Co., 173 Cal. 415 
[160 P. 241]; Taylor v. Hammel, 39 Cal.App. 205. [178 
P. 547J), are cases where plaintiff either made no offer to 
restore or else made the offer after an undue lapse of time 
from the notice of rescission, 80 that no cause of action for 
rescission ever arose. 
Plaintiff complied with Civil Code, section 1691, by her 
offer of restoration, the bona fides of which is not questioned. 
Thereafter, defendants twice acquired Space 101 at public' 
sales, and finally disposed of it to a third party. In the light 
"of these facts, the plaintiff's cause of action did not become ! 
"moot" when defendants reacquired the property. (Hillman: 
'f. Gordon, 126 Wash. 614 [219 P. 46, 51] ; Vodicka v.8ette, i 
(Mo.) 223 S.W. 578.) . 
[2] Defendants' second ground for their motion to dis· 
miss the appeal is based upon plaintiff's acceptance of her! 
homestead exemption at the time Apartment 702 was sold ! 
upon execution. Defendants contend that plaintiff thus ac- i 
cepted benefits from the judgment. Defendants rely on Turner ; 
v. Markham, 152 Cal. 246 [92 P. 485], but the case does not I 
support their position. In that case, the appeal was from ! 
the order subjecting the homestead to execution, and not 
from the judgment that was being enforced by execution. In' 
fact, that judgment was appealed, the appeal was heard and . 
the judgment reversed. (155 Cal. 562 [102 P. 272].) 
In order to benefit from the homestead, the proceeds of the 
sale under section 1245 of the Civil Code must be accepted 
by the judgment debtor within six months since they are pro-
tected from legal process for only that length of time. (Civ. 
Code § 1257.) Thus, the exemption usually must be accepted 
before the appeal can be completed. It may be proper to hold, 
as did the Turner case, that a judgment debtor, by accepting 
.... 'his homestead ejXemption, loses the right to challenge the order 
subjecting the homestead to sale. It is quite another matter 
to deprive him of his appeal from the original judgment. 
. In the Turner case, the potential liability of the judgment 
creditor to the purchaser at the execution sale· after reversal 
of the judgment on appeal and the possibility that the exemp- . 
tion proceeds could not be recovered from an insolvent judg-
·Code Civ. Proc., § 708, provides: "If the purchaser of real property 
sold in execution, or his successor in interest, be evicted therefrom· in 
consequence of irregularities in the proceeding" concerning the aale, 
or of the reversal or discharge of the judgment, he may recover the 
price paid, with interest, from the judgment creditor. . . ." 
) 
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ment debtor, caused the court to dismiss the .ppeal. 1Jnder 
the factS of the present case, the judgment creditor cannot 
be liable to the present owners of the property sold on execu-
tion, the McConnells, who have redeemed the property as 
successors in interest to plaintiff, the judgment debtor, since 
they will retain Apartment 702 regardless of the outcome 
of the appeal. R.edemption, even by a successor in interest 
of the debtor, terminates the effect of the sale. (Code Civ. 
Proe., § 703; CGlkins v. Steinbach, 66 Oal. 117, 120-121 [4: 
P. 1103}.) Thus, the Turner case is distinguishable not only 
because of the type of judgment appealed from, but also by 
virtue of the factual situations of the parties. 
The motion to dismiss the appeal must be denied. It is 
therefore proper for this court to consider the merits of the 
case. 
The Euluion of Evidence in Ihe B68cission Aotion 
[3-5] It is contended that the trial court erred in exclud-
ing plaintiff's testimony concerning the conversations between 
the parties before plaintiff purchased Space 101. Defendant 
objected to the evidence, on the ground that it constituted 
a variance from the issues raised by the pleadings. Plaintiff 
pleaded the common counts for money had and received. 
Plaintiff also pleaded, as a second cause of action, (1) that 
defendants had represented to her that Space 101 could be 
used and owned exclusively by its purchaser ; (2) that plain-
tiff relied on this representation in buying her share of the 
beneficial interest in the trust; (3) that plaintiff learned 
thereafter that the building and tire regulations precluded 
any owner of Space 101 from obtaining exclusive occupancy; 
(4) that plaintiff gave prompt and proper notice of rescission, 
offering to restore to defendants everything of value received 
from them. This complaint states a valid cause of action for 
rescission because of mutual mistake of law. (Hannah v. 
Steinman, 159 Cal. 142 [112 P. 1094]; Adams v. Heinsch, 
89 Cal.App.2d 300 [200 P.2d 796] ; Civ. Code, §§ 1576, 1578.) 
Plaintiff offered to prove the substance of these allegations, 
but the trial judge excluded the evidence. Even if the offered 
proof had constituted a variance, we cannot say that defend-
ants were "misled ... to [their] prejUdice in maintaining 
[their]' action or defense on the merits." (Cod-e Civ. Proc., 
§ 469 j cf. Wennerholm v. Stanford UlI·iv. School of Medicine, 
20 Ca1.2d 713, 716 [128 P.2d 522, 141 A.L,R. 1358].) 
Dpfendants contend also that plaintiff's testimony is an 
) 
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attempt to vary or modify the terms of a written agreement. 
The Certificate of Beneficial Ownership issued by the Security-
First National Bank to plaintiff is said to embody the agree-
ment of plainti1f and defendants in the words "such holder 
[plaintiff] • • • has the exclusive and permanent right of 
occupancy during the continuance of said Trust, of Space 
No. 101." (Code Civ. Proc., § 1856.) Extrinsic evic;lence to 
show mistake or fraud is admissible. Section 238 of the Re-
statement of Contracts states the general rule: "agreements 
prior to or contemporaneous with an integration are admissible 
in evidence: (b) to prove facts rendering the agreement void 
or voidable for illegality, fraud, duress, mistake or insuffi-
ciency of consideration." This court has approved the ad-
mission of extrinsic evidence to show a mistake of law by the 
grantor of a quitclaim deed, taken advantage of by the grantee. 
(Jersey Farm Co. v. Atlanta Realty Co., 164 Cal. 412 [129 
P. 593].) "It is, of course, true that where an instrument 
is sought to be avoided for fraud or for mistake in law or in 
fact, evidence is admissible as to what the grantor intended 
to do or to convey." (164 Cal. 412, 418 [129 P. 593]. Ct.· 
Mooney v. Cyriacks, 185 Cal. 70 [195 P. 922] ; Code Civ. Proc., . 
§§ 1856, 1860.) Since the testimony by plaintiff should not 
have been excluded either as a variance or under the parol 
evidence rule, the trial court erred in its ruling. This error 
precluded plaintiff from presenting her ease for recovery and 
requires reversal of the judgment for defendants in plainti1f'. 
action for rescission. 
Defendants' Counterclaim Por Int".", Paid 
Plaintiff does not deny that the $10,000 "bonus" for the 
loan of $10,000 was usurious interest under the Usury Law. 
(Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 3757.) She contends, however, 
that defendants were in pari delicto and cannot invoke the 
aid of the courts to recover the usurious bonus. Plainti1f also 
contends that the protection of the usury laws can be waived 
by the voluntary payment of excessive interest by the borrower. 
Neither proposition is tenable. 
[6] The Usury Law provides that any person who pays 
interest at a usurious rate may recover treble the amount 
paid, "providing such action shall be brought within one 
year after such payment or delivery." It is settled that this 
section did not abrogate any common law rights of borrowers 
as parties to an illegal contract, but merely added a statutory 
remedy to aid the borrower and penalize the lender. (W"t-
) 
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mtm V. Dye, 2140al. 28 {4 P.2d 134] ; Ta1iZOr v.'BUdd, 217 
Cal. 262 [18 P~2d 333].) Borrowers may .therefore bring 
an action for money had and received to recover usurious in· 
terest paid within two years of the suit. (Babcock v. OZkasso, 
109. Cal.App. 534 [293 P. 141]; Code Civ. Proc., §339(1).) 
Since the overpayment occurred on January 12, 1946, and 
the complaint was. filed March 26, 1947, defendants are not 
barred from setting up a counterclaim' to recover the interest. 
(Jones v. Mortimer, 28 Ca1.2d 627, 633 [170 P.2d 893].) 
[7] . Plaintiff relies principally on the dictum in Matthew. 
V. Ormerd, 140 Cal. 578,581 {74 P. 136], that the protection 
of usury laws can be waived by the voluntary payment of 
excessive interest by the borrower. The Matthews ease and 
the cases it relied on (Harralson v. Barrett, 99.Cal. 607 [34 
P. 342]; London If Ban Francisco Bankv. Bandmann, 120 
Cal. 220 [52 P. 583, 65 Am.St.Rep. 179]) are not in point. 
They involved a constitutional provision of limited applica-
bility, which did Dot penalize the lender with treble damages 
and criminal sanctions as does the Usury Law, but merely 
invalidated mortgage provisions requiring a mortgagor to 
pay taxes assessed against the interest of the mortgagee. 
Moreover, the party seeking to recover the interest paid in the 
Matthews ease was not the original borrower of the funds, but 
a third party who had purchased the mortgagor's interest. 
If the dictum of the Matthews ease were accepted, the pro-
tection of borrowers provided by the Usury Law would be 
vitiated. The theory of that law is that society benefits by 
the prohibition of loans at .excessive interest rates, even 
though both parties are willing to negotiate them. Accord-
ingly, "voluntary" payments of interest do not waive the 
rights of the payors' l "Payments of usury are not considered' 
voluntary but are deemed to be made under restraint. t J 
(Taylor v. Budd, 217 Cal. 262, 266 [18 P.2d 333].) If no 
loophole is. provided· for lenders, and all borrowers save 
fraudulent ones are protected, usurious transactions will be 
discouraged. 
[8] The cases interpreting the Usury Law have discarded 
the Matthews dictum. Moreover, they have refused to apply 
the allied doctrine urged by plaintiff that the parties are 
in pari delicto. An early case under the Usury Law, Douglas 
v. Klopper, 107 Ca1.App.Supp. 765 [288 P. 36], permitted 
the recovery of the amount paid in excess of the legal interest 
charge. In Babcock v. Olkasso, 109 Cal.App. 534 [293 P. 141] 
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(petition for hearing denied), the borrower sought both treble 
interest under the law and the recovery of additional in-
terest paid more than one year before the action. Both ele-
ments of recovery were sustained. In Westman v. Dye, 214 
Cal. 28 [4 P.2d 134], the defendant was permitted to set off 
all interest paid against the principal obligation. The pro· 
visions of the Usury Law permitting recovery of treble in· 
terest and making usury a crime on the part of the lender 
indicated to the court that the borrower is not to be treated 
as equally culpable with the lender. "The parties to a usurious 
transaction are not to be regarded as in pari delicto." (214 
Cal. 28, 35.) The limitation of the borrower's recovery to 
the amount charged in excess of the legal rate in Douglas 
v. Klopper, supra (107 Cal.App.Supp. 765), was expressly 
overruled in Taylor v. Budd, 217 Cal. 262, 267 [18 P.2d 333], 
and recovery was allowed of treble the interest paid within 
the last year and the full amount of interest paid during the 
year before that. The law in California is thus settled, al-
though the authorities in other jurisdictions do not form a 
consistent pattern. (E.g., Plitt v. Kaufman (1947), 188 Md. 
606 [53 A.2d 673] (borrower not in pari delicto); but see, 
Wright v. First National Bank, 297 Mich. 315 [297 N.W. 505] 
(recovery denied) ; 55 Am.Jur. §§ 111-112.) 
Proper enforcement of the law of usury precludes the 
blanket application of the in pari delicto doctrine. One 
method of preventing usury is to permit the recovery of 
usurious interest paid. During the first year after payment, 
the right of borrowers to recover treble the interest paid is 
enforced. It would be glaringly inconsistent to deny their 
right to recover the actual interest paid after the passage 
of one year. I 
It has been suggested that if the borrower was a "corrupt, 
collusive confidant who fraudulently inserted a usurious rate 
of interest for the purpost' of defeating an action for in· 
terest on the note," he might be estopped from urging the 
defense of usury. (Pa~1let v. Vroman, 52 Cal.App.2d 297, 
306 [126 P.2d 419], (petition for hearing denied).) In Ryan 
v. Motor Credit Co. (1941), 130 N.J.Eq. 531 [23 A.2d 607, 
611], affirmed in (1942) 132 N.J.Eq. 398 [28 A.2d 181, 142 
A.L.A. 640] (8-5 decision), cited by plaintiff, the borrower 
had obtained nearly 500 small loans from the same lender by 
using the names of nominees, which were often fictitious. 
forged, or "selected at random from telephone directories, 
from tombstones or taken from the thin air." These fl"auds 
) 
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enabled tht' parties to circumvent the New Jersey Small Loan 
Act. The borrower was denied "a reward of $50,000 to 
$63,000 for his fraud on the statute." (23 A.2d 607, 624.) 
Defendants were not fraudulent here; plaintiff had ample 
warning of the, usurious nature of the loan but persisted in 
making it. Defendants did not attempt to recover the interest 
. paid until sued by plaintiff in regard to another matter. 
There was no attempt to insert secretly . a usurious rate of 
interest in order to avoid the payment of any mterest or to 
take advantage of the treble damage provisions of the Usury 
Law. The trial court therefore did not err in permitting re-
covery of the interest paid. ' 
The'part of the judgment ordering that· plaintiff take 
nothing by her action for rescission is reversed. The part of 
the judgment that defendants recover judgment against plain-
tift' upon defendants' counterclaim is affirmed. '!'he appeal 
from the order denying the motion for new trial is dismissed. 
Each party is to bear his own costs' on this appeal. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, d., Carter, J.,Schauer, 
J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
